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16 May 1984 - Side One
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TI1is is the morning of 10 December, 1984.

'

-rla ~ .J~~e-

l as~,t..

C en-.-, c. 1

'(e'k

I'm at the home of Major General Edward

.

Gear Lansdal e and we are going to be recording another phase in the materials about his
life.

Well the last time I was here General, we'd gotten you into the beginning of WWII
Sometime or other during the Second WW, did you ever

and you had joined up with the OSS.
get to the EUropean theater?
Never.

d .- J. .

L:

Never.

C:

You spent all your time then in - where?

L:

In the U.S. and working on Asia - the Pacific area.

C:

IN the U.S. where were you stationed?

L:

In SAN Fran, Washington, and N.Y.

C:

What kinds of duties did you have in those years?

L:

INtelligence all of it.

Ne,,1a,,-

trying to collect maps and
Originally gathering information,
..,

that is get geographic information including maps, ~
()..s we,,/

- trying to get descriptions of roads

IJ

And lost materials and target iformation type of stuff. And
-==--It was the most fascinating thing I've ever run across of gathering

and stuff like that ~ trails.
that was it mostly.

that sort of information and getting to know places and the peoples and what was going on
there and what made them tick and the economies, the value of life and the structure of societies and so forth.

Which is a little deeper tl1an military ,needs really.

I just found

it fascinating and I was locating people in the U.S. - mostly Americans, but not necessarily
Americans - who had been traveling all around the world, so I met some very fascinating people:

geologists, explorers, one of them was an ictheologist who, I did a study with him on
I/

f

the poisonous and venomous fishes ~ the seas, with warnings and so forth to our
the Pacific, and he told me that I was the best editor that he'd ever found.
fascinated.

I never thought much about ictheology before.

been head of fisheries

0r

I was just

But along with the fishes he had

SOOl€thing.. out in the Phillipines before the war, and started tell-

ing me stories about the Phillipines in his travels around.
throughout the islands.

troops in

And he'd gone on foot practically

He knew the peoples extremely well and the common stories they'd

tell and their superstitions and what have you.

I found later that I was coming across ihis

trail in alot of places ','s:Jc: t( ;, and one of them was a racket that he'd come across - some
PHilipinos who were selling

SGme

urine f r om the mother of God and were putting it in little

-2vials.

And she lived up in a cave in the mountains and they were selling it to the super-

stitious people as a cure all and making good money or1 it.

And I was traveling in my jeep
L1A.~

,-i
on a road on the side of the same mountain that went down southern to blue osGfl
and I saw one

of our aircraft heading low that went into the peak and crashed up there.
in -l ,h e,je,e-p

a,

{:-t"e.,,...{..,().._,rJ$

People-±a eer

told me I was standing up~yellin g at the pilot.

Yu know, you damn fool, there's a mountain
-t-he,r-'L- ~
v'~
And he went in and I went up and M 'l fll o ':> ~ t.eR-Fewas
and all I

right ahead of you see?

=r=v-=

could think of was this ictheolog ist telling me this story.

And in talking to the people

I started asking about this and they said oh yeah, people remembered this gal who was the
motheri of God and so on.

I thought that's a wonderful place to live among~ people like

that.
C:

HOw long did you do this kind of work)General?

L:

It's all during the war and afterward s I got into more specializ ed intelligen ce, more

analyzing things that others had gotten all the informati on on, but doing analytica l work
and getting it prepared for others to read and use.
C:

You spoke of working in San Francisco and New York in the earlier part of the war.

Did

youfstay in the states during all of the war years?
L:

Practical ly yes.

C:

Where did you go on those trips?

L:

Well I got once as far as New Zealand and one trip into China, but it was very brief.

didn't do anything.

I got out twice on very short trips out in the Pacific.

)Io f-

:r,_

I mean I might just..BGt,- as wel :\ll have gone

F-e...l+-.

I

Except it was sort of fun

traveling around.
C:

You said when we talked last time that at the end of the war you were in Japa

I

was in the Phillipin es at the end.
L:

r .~·.vent out to be one of the bodies shoved into Japan on the big offensive and was sent
r ,-1 ;,f a.f -//R- e,;, d o{- --+I..~ W a r
L...Jkf-ofr to the Phillipin esn to be ready for the invasion. I forget -Wtrlit"" the invasion was called.
.+

0 ....

k~ had

two fancy names for it.

C:

Does Olympia sound right, or Olympic?

L:

NO, that's not it.

There were two of them.

I was one of the two.

was to go up onto HOnchu and the other was Kiushu or something.
of there and I was to go up into the main island.

I think one of them

In other words it was south

THey were figuring above 80% casulties .

-3-

Then you many bodies.

C:

Well, whe+e were talking last time, you were telling me about becoming part of the OSS

but I was uncertain exactly as to how that happened.

L:

Well, I was recruited in there.

I'd given up my commission in the reserves; --We=were

t-e,5 i-:J ned

assi gt1Gd before the war >quite a bit.

I'd gotten mad about some things so when the war came

along, I was trying to get it back.

I wanted to serve in the war.

I had two boys then.

I lost my job because I was trying to get in the service, my boss took a very dim view of
I wanted to leave him and go to war.

~

I'd be a damn fool to do it.

And he fired me so ~

ges

o-.fur.tunate'\¥,~

So the military intelligence service. had opened up a place in

San Francisco run by friends of mine who were working there and one of them was also helping
Iv\

OSS get started.

So he said I think you want to getAwhile you're waiting for youfcommission

'!:P

and everything,icome on down here and see if you can help these people out.

Which I did.

And they were recruiting, which I was doing for them, and trying to put together training
courses and whatnot and I wrote some of them for them, not knowing a goddamned thing of course.
And Bill Vanderbilt came out to9.lie was in the Navy had been governor of Rhode Island or

~ ~ o II e, r',

something, he came out to San Francisco to open up a branch office for OSS out there /1 And
I helped him for a time and we became very close friends. ( He's dead now hfi11il I was helping
him set up shop and also helping the military intelligence service w ~'-~ c.&'.>~y.

And the

Army just had great demands for information and we were trying to satisy those as well.
I was sort of the handy man for - and they both put me under contract.

And the Army came up

and gave me back my commission - reserve coomission.
C: At what rank were you then?

L:

'

I think I came back as a 1st LT.

1st LT.

CAuse that' s whe.n I ~-Oio~ks: igfled, I'd been a

I'd gotten one through college through going to ROTC and so on and

C:

By the end of the war what was your rank?

L:

Major.

Major.

..

-eJ

.,.,.,~ ~-0

C:

And this was with the U.S.Army?

L:

Yeah.

C:

In your book you say that you didn't really want to revert to civilian life at the end

of the war.

Army of the United States.

So

It's a reserve on active duty.

That you saw possibilities for an American in the military service and that

-4you felt a strong appeal in the U.S. military's part in creating democratic institution s
in the Pacific.

L:

Yeah.

v'e'..
Which I had done in the Phillipines and were doing in Japan at the time.
.I\

I was

very impressed when I went up to Japan and I saw the attitude of the Japanese people towards
MacArthur, who I felt was a prima donna al'Jso forth) along with many others irythe military.
But he was very effective and I've since c ~ to have a very great respect for that guy.
v.)\...
He might have been an actor and so forth, I'm sure he was, but he was a very effective
,..
person.

TI-lank God for that.

I think he was lousy as an advisor and commander in the Philli-

pines during the Japanese attack there in '41 '42 but, certainly later he was very great.

~~-- '-:>~~"-tt~

But they, and compared to the civilian we had out there.in ba~te~s and aid administrat or~
or econom ic~ people and so on, the military were strangely farmore liberal in their
political thinking and their insistence on democratic ways of doing things.

ANd the civil-

ians were very straight laced and I think they'd have opted for dictatorshi p and wherever
they'd have put another Hilter in Germany and Lord knows what in Japan, and a military rule
there again.
C:

desegrate itself.
L:
C:

whk.,~

Well it strangely worked that way.

@a:4 ~ )
Yeah.

!£- was the first institution in this country to

To give women equality of opportunity .

The army's a strange institution .

It was enlightenin g to me anyhow.

Someone said abo~t McCarther, that when he became military governor there in Japan,

jsCAP

that the honor that was accorded him by the Japaenese, which was similar to what they'd
accorded the Ernporer, he didn't feel that was sufficient.
({~..,..~'-'~ ~\.

L:

L', W e,t (,

i+

CD.,_/d

Well, naw, he was quite a person.

grudgingly gotten that way.

h.,,__ve., h e e,,n,

I've come to have a very high regard for him.

ANd I'm a little bit tainted...a,ootlt Navy beliefs about him you

know and what have you, but he was quite a corrmander.

-r-he..y re..,,1/y o/ Jd.

C:

Yes.

Yes.

Sort

by

And the Phillipinos loved that guy.

I guess even today they still • • •

L Oh yeah. yeah.

I remember when Truman fired him out there the Phillipine President asked

me to come down to a

cabinet meeting1 which I did; and he and the cabinet asked me would the

American President, meaning Truman, get very angry if the Phillipines suggested, invited

-+ (A_e,,

McCarthur to live out the rest of his life in teh Phillipines - they'd made him an honorary
h .,.,..-Icitizen ~they wanted to have him l ive there and they were going to send that to him.

-5And I said, no I think the United States would be very pleased if you do something like
I don't think he's going to, but it's a very nice gesture ~go ahead and make it.

that.

'

They said, well will Truman and the United States cut off all aid to us?

~v-~~

Something as

And I said, no no, they never would.

as that.

Well , Truman would have been very happy had McCa t t;:h nr ,fflttl&=fiaue bben :very::t i a ~d

C:

; 11

-l---k a.

P"' ·· I : f P ; n

e 5

McArthur gone to live/\the rest of his life , i n the Phi.ll:~es.
SUre. Sure.

L:

So they went ahead and composed the wire there on yellow paper, ruled
+L,. e y

paper like you got there, that message to McArthur and I helped them with it and i sent it.
I said, tell the guy how m4ch you think o½him.

i \e~ "''"""

Jt \A .,._:,

~

--'

·

THat's the important thing.

Hls feelings

..r. ~...,,. .J..,

are hurt right now.' ~,Hrs feelings are hurtt' Yes,11 his feelings are hurt.
L. ·. , y e, ..c.,,h ,

C:

You said by the end of the war you had two sons? ~~at are their names:

L:

They first one is Edward - the same as me - I gave him a different middle name.

Edward Russell.

And the second one is Peter Carrol\ - Carroll's another family name.

It's
Russell's

a family name and Carrol\' s a family name.

L:

Is that with 2 r's and 2 l's?
-rt. e,
Yes. T-ffl same as the guy who signed the Declaration who's a forebearer.

C:

Is that right?

L:

Yeah.

C:

Charles Carroll of Carrolltown

L:

THAt' s right.

C:

Yeah.

be.- ·s t,1_.,r--e-.-a... .... d.
There were alot of Charles Carrolls around and he wanted King George to Afind the right

C:
one.
I

~

0

h e.,

w r of e.. ,. ,

L:

He sure wanted to put his address on it.

C:

That's right.

That's a good story.

c .~

You -kimt find me here, oh boy.

Do you have any daughters or other sons that were

born l!ater?
L:

NO.

Those are the only two.

Their mother, my first wife, died after I retired and

come back from Vietnam the last time.

d,~

\

I was living down .-t-el:tt.-e near Mt. Vernon.

trying to remember when the cls=t;e::wf that was.

' 74 I believe she died.

BUt, I'm

And then Pat, whom

I'd known in the Phillipines before, who had never been to the U.S., retired from her work
at the Embassy out there and came on to see the United States.

She'd been working in the

-6-

infonn ation program and she came to see if the U.S. was as good as
she'd been tellin g everybody it was in the inform ation program. And so we got
el, ~ ~ she'd been
tplere a time.

___
\..A~v-:___ _ f.(__
. _
....;__

C:

did you leave the servic e at all for a while after WWII?

L:

NO.

I stayed in the Army.

I got an Air Force commission.

The Air Force ordere d me to

go to

to report into the 13thlA ir Force. And I told the people up there,
the 13th was
L.u?:..,D "'- ~ tup in the middle of ber,Jis aoo Clark Field, they said, I was ordere
d to do something here by
Gener al McArthur, and which I'm now doing and they aren't about to
let me go from what I'm
doing out of this headq uaters so, if you want me why don't you just
tell Gen. McArthur? And
they said, you report to duty here , t f( € -~ \ h{t"" • So it never got
resolv ed and I didn't I really didn't go into the Air Force until I cAME back to the U.S.
when I went to Intell igence Schoo l, the Strate gic Intell igenc e Schoo l.
C:

Where was that locate d?

L:

In Lowry Air Force Base in Denver, Colora do.

I though t I was going to go to school there.

or

+h,,+
They were going to make ma.an intelli gence office r, instea d1they
had me teachi ng classe s
-ltt>
there. It was sort of strang e. I never paid any attent
ion !d't' air intelli gence before , but
I taught strate gic intell igenc e and they wanted me to teach econom
ic intell igenc e,so th~
public librar ies in Denver were very good and I ciecided tu give non-.:
.lassif ied lectur es to
ec,Ll_\J C><-l.~ c,{
these studen ts and see how much I~ge~ Gftthe librar ies, which I did.
And I gave very long
lectur es on the Soviet Union and so on and I was amazed on how much
I could get on the publicatio ns open to the public .

ABout the Soviet Union and about the Iron Curtai n count ries

and so, on.

Enough to make up real strate gic bombing lists and figure out the
value of
certai n things throug h the economy and to the Soviet Union, the people
, and its ~ntegr al
whole. And learne d to look throug h the words . of Soviet pe,cen tages
that they
very,

'i~ e...cn;,-;o
· ~e-;;-t\1 report s

·
very, f unny - they Just
\ he figure
·
love"'t
s to -

~i:-'

and they'l l say that a

Artie statio n, 50% of the female doctor s and 10% of the male doctor
s got marrie d up at this
"50
statio n. You discov er that there were two women up there and
tlra1=- one of them got marrie d and
1
so on. BUt it's confus ing. It's coveri ng up the real facts. TI-Iey
don't ever get down to
something real simple and tell you what really happened. So you learn
to sort of l i l r: co
read them with your tongue in your cheek and sort of read furthe r
into them.

-7-

C:

What year was it that you actually received you( commission in the Air Force?

L:

It was when the Air Force started.

C:

1947?

L:

'47.

C:

OK.

+-t.."-y

Why did tl::ly plunk you back a grade?

.

re,ser ✓ e__,/j
/i/l)i- a....
ther e ~ a --Gc:rtei::u amount

+ti.e..

L:

/

I don't know.

Probably because

of regular officerw, I imagine.

The Army promoted me to Lt. Col. out there right at the end while releasing me.
help at all.

So that didn't

I

C:

So you came back two grades then?

L:

Well, yeah but I never took it as a real promotion of any sort.

C:

That was also the day and age of permanent and temporary promotion~

L:

That's right.

C:

So you were a temporary Lt. Col. and maybe your permanent grade at that point was only

a Capt.?
.,__,'"I be...., J
Yeah A Something like that.
(Y\

L:

Something like that.

WEll they were always very reluctant

about promoting me/ and I never paid any attention to it and during the war they checked on
some U.S. agency.

WHy they'd gone ahead and done something that started a big project against

Japan, and they said, well,Lansdale came in and told us it was important to do it.

ANd they

5a-;d

s4ad- he was a 1st Lt.

He was in uniform.

U.S. Army, they said.

ANd they'd gone ahead and done it.

Well he was talking like he was head of the whole

(,l\e,_'lb(P)

is what U.S. and American Agency should be doing on it you see?
it.

I spent my whole service that way.

I just thought this

And they went ahead and did

Many, many have said, I wish I could have done what you

did) you knowJ in getting to do the things you wanted to do and were worth doing. ANd I said,
w r~
they ~ there for anybody if you get enough nerve to do it. And they used to bawl me out.
jtAs-1-

I used to get terrible bawlings out and I'd ~

say, well, I went into the service for patriotic

y-e4.s6n :>

r~€ls0Hs=-and I' 11 quit for the same damn reasons.
I can.

I just want.C to serve my country as best ,

I'll make up my own mind what that is.

C:

And yet that's a very H~usual attitude for someone in the military - especially at those
k e\ cL
;-- K,
company grade and middle~ grade ~
.
,L,/o.

L:

Oh yeah.

WEll, r1'J.made up my mind long ago how I wanted to live my life and not doing ___

-8-

but how.

That indepence was part of it.

When I was in high school once, I sat on the front

lawn of my house there in Los Angeles at the time, and started thinking, I guess I'd been
·-fr; flAt.~
told to think of college and what I wantedAas a life, something or other - career or something,
so I started figuring out how people lived and how far they go, and at the time we had all
sorts of great villians in history and great heroes and everything, and what motivated them
and how they looked at themselves and so forth, I started thinking that way and thinking do
+. /ll'lJ T. W4-'1 ../e,d , . ,
I want to make alpt of money and if so why, and that didn't strike me as what I \mnted to day
¥,.,"'-\_'\M\
.f~V
and I startedAwhat makes an American and what is a real goal of the AMerican dream for a
C

person to want to achieve and I finally figured out for myself what it was - that independence
of spirit and being a free spirit was definitely a part of it ~ ANd I lived my own life that
way.

I did

when I was in advertising, and I did when I got into the military and I don't

need to now, I mean it's a part of me now.

But many people, youngsters can't find themselves
weA(

and leave home and their families and everything to go and find themselves, w1ei-I wish they'd
sit down like I did in high school that time and really start figureing out what the values
fook..
are in life, what I as a person ~anted to reach and wl:lat- for. ANd I'm happy now that I did
it.

I was suprised that my brothers hadn't did it.

Cause I started askting them the/ same

questions and neither one of them thought about it that much.
C:

+kl maveric~s,
Well, you've been around the military long en~gh General, to know hta-t
and I
L', i.~, r

~ ,-....u ~l>...

L',1/i.4,f1~d;;rre.d --

think, you were kind of a maverick,,that mavericks are often not received well ~ and there are
any number of officers - oh, a captain will step out of line once, will disagree with a superior once, and he gets shuttled off into a closet someplace.

Or a major general will disagree

with a Lt. Gen. and it's the end - how over all these years could you be so independent and
still be trusted so much?
L:
T\ D Y1 e_

~

Well, first of all I think most of my actions were unselfish ones.
0 (:.

-J-t._e,

CLe,,/- ,• O "

~

were self serving in nature.

IBe things that they'd would get angry about were actually

actions done for the greater good of our country.
question.

I didn't, '10e of these .. .

IBe motives were ones that they couldn't

ANd I think that made them madder than anything.

rtould.

It usually does and

there were the usual niceties that I never bothered with to follow - going to staff colleges
and so forth~

They used to tell me in personnel and everything, you haven't made anytkt-tt~

and you couldn't anyhow because you're too old or something.

Just, after I didn't tell them

-9-

I'd just come back from the White House and the President asked me if I wanted to go to the
War Col~ge - he'd send me -

~ ""'~~I f .

He said, I think you' re too old now but I' 11 request

it personally and they'll accept it, which they would have.
National War College.

J :J"+

Well I ~

Eisenhower did that once to the

ANd everybody was telling me ehhh, you've never been to the War College.

s .... ,,

well I could have gone you know.

mean that much to me.

I just kept that to myself.

I'd gone up and taught there.

It didn't

I'd given lectures there at all of our
./

War Colleges and used to when I was in the service, butYnever regretted that I didn't go, but
I didn't feel I didn't need it - it would have been nice to have gone, but people that get in
trouble and get rebuffed and so forth and shoved into closets are people who can be wounded
that way.

And I don' t think I was ever in a position to be wounded.

I was wounded and cut into pieces and everything, and I'd

I was, everybody thought

still be going and I just readjusted

my goals and going, well they stopped me from doing that - this still needS'~ing and I'm the
only one who can do that, so I'm going to stay ·and do that.

ANd they did that the last time

in Vietnam, they really stopped me cold and what I was trying to do there and

c.1~

1~

the U.S.

didn't know how to fight the war and the people in power and the bueracracies and everything1 +he_
b oL•~...,r.a..e-' ...,,s
Wt>V\. $(.(,\ ) they stopped me cold.
But they didn't win a goddamned thing for our country and
that's the only thing I regret, not for myself at all.
C:

How should we have fought that war?

L:

Well, first of all we should of helped the Vietnamese to be strong enough to have fought

it and to have gotten into the politics and psychology of a conrnunist.sf-1:%f people's war.
Which would have been hard to do but we could have taught them.

WE could have made the enemy

leadership a target for attack as they made our leaders a target for their psychological and
political attack.

We could have made a lot of things subject to psychological attack which

if it had been native Vietnamese fighting they could have done.
--1--"-e,se..,

Vietnamese that ~

It was hard to teach the

were important things to do, but that could have been done.

do that every time I was with them.

I used to

The United States thought it was non• sense, that is our

key officials out there, never understood that.

I don't think any of them understood that a

leadership was a committee up there, a corrmittee that was just begging to be defeated by
Lyndon Johnson who had been the city board supervisor or something in one of the Texas cities,
he could have licked them.

l..(.) e....,C:.,

But he never understood that there ...Yl.el'.e

~

~

enemy leadership, I

-10-

don't think he ever got the names of any of the enemy ~leaders up in Hanoi.
let them get away with murder on the thing.

But they were telling the people, look these

guys are bringing you this and why don't you get rid of them and everything
we used to do with the Kaiser and with Hitler and so.
with a couple of revolutions in fact.

He certainly

Kicking o u t ~ leaders.

in the 20th centruy for being against George III.

ich

We got the German people to go through

-1-Ae.,,ir-

WE got mad at the British originally, at George III.

Ctle~,bl~ ~

We used to get mad at that.

a..,

And tfte. guy got elected mayor in Chicago

TI-le Americans hated King George that much.

But we made sort of a hero out of Ho Chi MinhJ which was silly.

We never fought politically.

And I was trying to get the Vietnamese to take the role of leading the fight to save themselves.
And there were some good Vietnamese leaders

and I wanted

~ to

learn to do it and let them

--<"'C'.\V\D

take the ~@igns and lead themselves out of trouble and run the government - make mistakes and

;+

learn from tt'tem when they'd make one.

As it was with the Americans we were doing things our-

selves that the Vietnamese should be doing - taking away the initiative from them.

We talked

down our noses to them so that if the/1made a mistake they'd hesitate to ever let us know it
and admit it.

TI-Iey were afraid we were going to bawl them out or laugh ,at them or something,

or maybe cut off aid and everything.

We wouldn't trust you guys with help this way.

The

last time I went out, I figured that the Vietnamese leadership needed friends and they were
bae-...,

..,_ >

+ lv2..,,1

all afraid of me, the generals ~knew they killed a friend of mine - Ngo Dinh Diem, when
they'd come in.

And I said no, you're stuck where you are now and I want to help you succeed.

Cause it's your country and they all started coming over to my house and dropping in and ou-v
Ambassadors and other officials were suprised that they used to come over to my house to talk
to me and hwere Vietnamese leaders and their wives and families would drop in just as a friend.
And they didn't take me as being an official.
and so forth.

And they also let me know mistakes they'd made

I used to sit there quietly face to face with them and go over some of their

programs and where they'd gone wrong and would never bawl them out.
do you correct that?

~

How do you get it so it works right?

And ~

I was always well, how

,,--,-

all these people depend-

on ,\-1,1.:-s

ing on this and everything and they're going to need some helpi and why don't you do it this
way and get so and so.

+-

~\-

And they knew 1.ait so, and that's what we should have done with that

sort of help_wibh Vietnam.
C:

You say that we did things that they should have been doing for themselves, could you give

me examples of this?

-115tL

L;

Oh, alot of the example the aid missi on there would get
prov incia&
t to get help
into peop le. 1Hey 'd start runni ng out of rice or some
thing . We were tryin g to teach the
f•D ,J#fl C,, l,A.,,/
prov incia l Vietnamese lpffi cials to take care of their
own aid programs and so on. So we'd
get the government to distr ibute rice up to peop le for
the needy and the American advis ors
up there would see the rice coming in and they, the provi
nce chief , the Vietnamese would be
worry ing abous wel ~ how does Saigo n want me to do this?
Well , they 'll fire me if I do it wrong
And there was alot of that.

They were wondering what to do and the Americans would
say, these
peop le are hungry and they' d grab the rice and you ~
distr ibute it this way, throw it on the
• ~
.
..J-,; a..,+.i v' -e..,
I t'\ '
truck , go out and distr ibute it. ANd take all the
I\ away from them inste ad of
telli ng the provi nce cheif;, well, you do this if you want,
I' 11 call up my frien d up ln Saj.gon
.
I
.I ~~ c ""' ~ a c..~ .
and he' 11 back you and so on so the government won' t
D ~ . 'IO'-' ~,- •
. 1Hey' d neve r
do it that way, they' d take it over . So then the provi
nce chief would miss the oppo rtuni ty
to maybe have done it a littl e wrong and every thing but
there was a grea t deal of that all
""tt.-:S '
over the coun try. The same in the milit ary /I;-I- Some
of the Vietnamese resen ted it and still do>
and some of the Vietnamese are going to be writi ng books
and every thing . There is a feeli ng

l

of bitte rnes s towardSthe Americans who were there .

ANd I think in abou t 10 years ther e'll be

books out abou t the thing s that the Americans did wrong
in Vietnam. By peop le on our side
who we were helpi ng. And they 're hesit ating to writeqfl l 1"
;1beca use it will look iike ingra titud e
and every thing , but there are very deep feeli ngs on this.
I know the forei gn Mini ster and then
he became Presi dent of their Assembly over there - a
polit ician ,and a very disti ngui shed
publ ic serva nt wants to come and work here in Washingto
n with the Wilson Cente r as a fello w,
to write a piece esse ntial ly on1 could Vietnam have won
the war under Presi dent Diem? Meaning
if you Americans hadn 't [tape ends] .

.
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c1~k

Yeah you were saying that that will take care of part of the political

aspects that no American has written on yet.
L:

Yes. That's true.

ANd this is by a Vietnamese politican.

I hope he understands he can

express himself cllearly enough on the politics and the psychology of things.
me to act as one of the sponsors.

I want to see something like that

to push real hard for his getting this fellowship.

He's asked

attempted.

So I'm going

But there's another Vietnamese in Texas
o•L-t-

a university, that'swritte n me, and he writing a book about the American Ambassadors~in Vietnam.

And I'm sure, he wants to know which Ambassadors were friends to Vietnam and were acting

really like diplomats should.

And which ones were coming out there as Vice Consulates as
-le I I,·,. ')
proconsulat es of the Unites States, mighty United States, and t ehH.--±ng them you either do it
our way or else we'll stop all aid and all help and so
C:

I think the answer is yes.

L;

That's what some of them saw themselves as.

C:

Oh yes sir.

L;

But he was writing me and I said well, you talk to Vietnamese.

That's what they were.

figure out what policy they were following from the

I said, don't try to

Department of State.

Do it from a

Vietnamese viewpoint of how these people looked to you and what all your contacts with them
t:J_ C: C.o'L n

and everything.

I said that'll be a true ~

f--

t you can write.

It'll be one nobody else can

do and if you try to figure out what policies they were following from Washington - I don't
~

~ver~l½

think you canA

that out clearly enough, which is what he'd wanted to do.

l(C:i<J.

And so

?ef' -,

but, these are thoughts of refugees l of some of the old leaders that have come here. ANd I'm
~ b~~aJo.~
sure that they're going to be thinking that way. Ther e were t wo of th~ . ~
rds
to the
U.S •. One of them is writing a book, one of them isn't - but he's very bitter the same waY.
And they come over and talk to me and I say, put it in a book or tell somebody this.
You know my feelings.

WEll you're a friend, we can talk to you.

It's the same thing .

WHy me?
Because

I've been a friend out in Vietnam and made it very easy to talk to me, which the American

l_cJ,ie_

officials knew,
these people.

I ~~id1 no, it's not patience I'm trying to listen to what they're really saying

hcl «..aP, a.l\

l\-- \s

l\nd I teW ___ t.Ris.

want~

said, he put it down, he said, you've got patience to spend time with

And I'm no

to hear what they think first.

in thei hearing what I think.
And then I' 11 respond to it.

I

-2-

C:

someone like Gen. Maxwell Taylor or Lodge flies from

Well don't you think that ~

tlb- /4

terr city and tj,.e ou~tj
~Jl ~~ s t\

Washington to Saigon, spends one day on a carefully sponsored tour --£9
lying

1aio~;nd then before flying back to the STates they tell the Vietnamese..( don't you

think

...the:1 speaking from ~

L: [Laughs].

6f

simply a well of experience and knowledge?
.f-h e

COCA~~

No that's what we do all the time and of course ~

Vietnamese, more of them

are aware of that.
C:

How can any responsible person do that?

L:

Yeah.

people.

That's

HOw can we?

-

How can they be so egotistic?

I don't know.

WE seem to be very good at turning out

1Hey're doing that in Washington all the time.

So.

WE used to send people over

there and I used to say, you know Washington is a big city and we're used to alot of these
antics among Americans and we can understand them and maybe forgive them or at least not pay
attention to some of the more annoying habits.
to foreign countries?

But goddamn it - why do we have to export it

ANd have them as officials there?

And we had a number of officials

like that who served in Vietnam.
C:

Those same officials jumped down Jane Fonda's throat because she travelled to Hanoi,

went on a carefully sponsored tour, after 12 hoursj in the city sl1e makes this pronouncement
that the North Vietnamese are simply humanitarian and they wouldn't torture anyone.
we sayJhow stupid can she be?

And

But we sent our own officials to Saigon .and in the same

length of time they became experts.
L:

Yeah.

There are other factors in there.

First of all we have prisoners who were hurt

because of what Fonda said.
.,

. (

C:

Oh absolutely.

L:

And to me what she did was unforgettable.

<..jtveab ,e

THE other guys were stupid jerks who came

out that
C:

Maxwell Taylor - a stupid jerk?

L;

Well, not a stupid jerk [laughs]

C:

Come on1 General.
,T'" ,
C. fo~e__ +<:J
, cold, thinking, short sighted person.
A patrician

L- ;

L:

beings I'm afraid.

He doesn't understand human

And the same with Lodge - very patrician again.

Again, I don't think

,
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he ever understoo d that he was dealing with real live human beings out there.
think Taylor ever did.
C:

I don't think Westmoreland ever did.

NO.

And I don't

TI,at is too bad.

Well, Westmoreland, someone was telling me, maybe it was you General, that he arrived

in-countr y knowing no Vietnamese, and not liking the Vietnames e.
L;

No, I didn't tell you that.

C:

And he left knowing no Vietnamese and

liking none of the Vietnamese.

And from what

I know about the man that pretty well sums up.
L:

Yeah. That might be true. He used to go out and see the Chief of STaff every Monday early
-1-h e.r1
and tm.1 they'd go down to essential ly a U.S. country team meeting - they called it something

else out there, I forget what.

I was a member of it but I forget what it was.

And when

WEsty was leaving his place was taken by Abrams [name supplied by Currey], Abrams asked me to
1
~
,._
;I
see him and have lunch with him alone, said you got any thoughts on what I should do? And
~i.

~e,
I told him, well, at least change the way you visit the Chief of Staff of the Vietnaml!.Army.

I

II

i\.

said,

Westy goes out and sees him, he goes out in convoy really, in his sedan.

an aideand bodyguards with him, he's got extra bodyguards wi--tlr him

He's got

in a 6x8 truck after him

with machine guns and so forth mounted and a couple of jeep loads of heavily armed troops with
him and with police fore and aft on motorcycl es. This is a big convoy and they go out early,
at 6:00 in the morning or something like that out to the Vietnamese headquart ers and Gen.
7
Vien is out there and he's got his troops lined up and they present arms and up comes this
cu1d

big convoy ~

out steps thePt8nsu l of the United States.
'(l

morning1 General?

HOw are things going?

1'-

t\

And he said, how are you this

\ \ 5a.y-,-f-/.e0 BJ1t'-rat-/ ,

Fine, he 3aid.

Of course they are.

\'

an army and he's got an army too.

,..

1)1is guy's got

A,v.,ieH'l/."lw<i

Everythin g's well with my army.So the~ proconsul tells
u

him how goddamed well everythin g's going with the U.S. Army and says, how's it going with
\,\. \

yours?

\,\.

Fine says
o~&J·

the Vietnamese General.

TI-IE American general goes down to the meeting and

tells the1 Americans everythin g's going well with the Vietnamese.
deserted or something but they aren't about to tell him.

Half their troops have

-4Well, I said, now General Abrams, do you drive?
a tanker, and he says Of course I do.

Of course, the guy's

Whyn't you go over in a jeep
o:..,n

,:)t... ;de.--

and take an aide if you want but, you don't need me, really. You go
Leo \J l!.-v\ V1evi
over in a jeep. Vien'll be there with all his troops lined up and
Be a human being •

you say Can I park my jeep around here someplace?

• (pick some worry

Go out, and first thing say I'm worrying about
with your troops

they aren't doing right) and Vien'll say "You haven't

heard anything yet.

Let me tell you what's happening with mine."

And you get down to the truth very quickly.
each other a little bit.
of these things.

And maybe you can help

And maybe you can buck each other up on some

And I said, better yet, instead of going over there,

hJ~

he's got to come from way out of town t (l{et over to~headquarters in
the morning.

Whyn't you invite him over to breakfast?

You live not

too far from his headquarters and he can come and have breakfast with
you and go to work.

And the two of you sit alone.

overhearing and everything.

If he

out in the next room with yours.

Don't have servants

wantsto bring aides, they can eat
I said, it's about time we got the

v-f +/,,.(1., re,,
thing on the basis of human beings talking to each other ~
that was a good idea.
or not.

He said he'd do it.

•

And he thought

I don't know whether he did

But he was the type of guy that would.

Now, I suggested things

like that to Westmoreland who wouldn't want to listen to me on it.
used to go in and he'd just tell me to shut up.

I

I'd bring up a

psychological warfare ideas to him and troop behavior and so forth
l)..S'e J.

-/-r,

(and he~ tick them off in little notes:

troops misbehaving.

I'd get

reports from Vietnamese and get them over to him personally to get
someone to look into it and he would never really talk

to me.

Very

hard to talk to him.
C:

Well, I'm sure he would talk to you, but it was very hard for him

--

-5to listeri to you.

L:

Oh, maybe that was it.

Maybe that was it.

I'd go over and have

breakfast with him once in awhile, or lunch, or something, just the
he'd
t wo of us alone or /have a visitor, and his visitors would come over
and have lunch with me afterwards.
remember when the

They would tell me and • • • I

first VC rbckets came in after the Tet Offensive

and they started rocketing Saigon.

goddamed big things coming

One of them was a guest of Westy's and he said Jesus! Westy's

in.

never heard those rockets.

I

They hit the house next door, and they

said, I'll show him where the thing was fired from.

I've been trying

to get the military to get over there and clean out
the spot where these guys are carrying these things in and setting
them off oyer across the river.

I'll show you exac t ly where.

~

·

Y::, used to do that when there were attacks on Tan Son Nhu_t and everything.
Which I stopped because they immediately started shelling everything in
e,l'Y'~/ :1,h,,.d-.

,::,..nd,.

sight and all my friends were getting killed ~

their homes

Couldn't

get the American troops out to hand-to-hand stuff; you know ~ confrontae. -./Q,,ry ..//4,-,,,J

tion.

They didn't get in close enough so's you don't blow up ce¥PJ"J i Ilg

for ten miles off.
C:

What is your feeling , General Lansdale , about the troop buildup

~vef--t;here+- of America in Vietnam?

L:

Did we need those troops there?

Well, it was . • • there were empires of , you know, headquarters ,

and of

/ ·.

i4 \ '> , --i-Jiier;e,. The

combat troops had a tremendous backstopping

of headquarters and supply units and so forth that stagger ed the
imagination.

The -- I don't think we needed all that.

/
-6--'

C:

Do you know General DeWitt Smith, General?

L:

No.

C:

He was

commandant of the War College for two different tours.

+-v

l'\Ae,..

And he said-1 someth:i..ng to the effect that, this is a paraphrase,
. .s
t k PX s
1
. t h e m1..d st o f a war zone t o soc
1 1.n
.
l y 1.mmora
•
· ·w:a:s
h
s1.mp
It
tat
with French perfumes and nylons.

And he was concerned about all this

backstoppin g of combat troops withcombat service support (interrupt)

L: f-/a., ; r -s I' r .._ y

L:

.

Friend of tnine wrote a song the hairspray in the PXs.

comment on MacNamara and his • ·

about getting hairspray into the

-H"~""

They're gonna drop it on the VC from the air and kill)'f all cr;i

PXs.
~

C:

It's a

Laugh~.

Well, I worked out the ratio once.

.

I don't know whether this is

we.,

correct, but as nearly as I could figure, ii

h&.-J
wffB

something like 52

or 53,000 combat troops actually performing combat duties when we
country.
had 550,000 troops in :.ldmxRX That's 1/l0th , 1/l0th of our soldiers.
L:

Yeah.

C:

effectively fighting.

L:

Yeah. I wonder if -awe- had that many.

we.-

How about American policies like, oh, supporting Diem early on
-'rke-t be.c.-~- e..
in his agrovilles and New Life villages and then ea.me-strate gic hamlets

C:

where we rounded up Vietnamese and moved them into protected areas.
What was your attitude toward that?
L:
by/

I think that was. wrong.

Br i t isher that never understood how they won down in Mala ya.

was in charge .
C:

That was a British idea e ss.e nt ially, and

He was running things.

Sir Robert Thompson.

He

-7+tte.-,-u
L:

Yeah.

But I've been in meetings with the British /land I started

telling them how they won in Malaya, and they never understood the
Malayans.

They were a wonderful people.

And as soon as they gave

11alaya independence they started winning the war.

Of course, they were

against Chinese guerrillas who looked different, you could spot them.
i,... $+-~,.ti y.

The Malayans could spOt them A Which the British didn't always do.
But they never understood that their victory there owed a great deal
' +~f'
to the political act of independence~~which I've gotten in talking to
some of the -M alayan politicos.

And the Brits used to come over to the
-/--y r>e- c { e n em v
Ph±llippines, cause we were fighting the same k:i:ml-- of men at the same
ti-me.

And they'd be amazed at the little things that we did that were

blown up out of all proportion (they said).
psychol0gt'cal action.

That's all.

So, well, that's

As long as everybody believes it,

fine.

Tt's to our favor. We're trying to make it come true . They
1-ti~Nj +-hDl;LJ I,_/thoughtll that was terrible. I said, well, the other side's doing that
$".ti,;,te ,:>(:,

all the

~~e

goddam ti-me, see, and if we can get away from it then

apparently we are, Thad no idea it would spread so far.

You're hearing

stories- over on the mainland of Asia that they're this way, well, why
T 1m all for :j:t.

But apparently the connnunists . thought that themselyes.

Didn't believe that.

Which is, we should ha1Ve fought that way in

Vietnam, see, I'd learned all that in earlier fighting in the Philippines.
C:

Tf you could have succeeded in having Ngo Dinh Diem adopt your

suggestions • . .
L:

He did originally, when he was firs.t president.

He got someone like

Lou Conein, who was there at the time or Rufe Philipps, who was there.
When Ngo Dinh Diem was first president t hey said it was very different.

-8The • • . Vietnam was, being run decently and so forth.

Nhu and the

political party people who were with him had secret police arresting
people.

r

got it stopped.

I went down and asked Diem about it and he

His brother was doing it. He didn't tell -hffl: ~ e,, +ha-f-..t-t,,,,_;f-.
And I just said well the families
a'bette-:H:.-=±b-a-t 1 knew ~ut it.
didn't know- about it.

are coming to me.

That you guys are

What am I going to tell them?

worse than Adolf Hitler or something,you know?
stopped it right fast.

No, no, no.

And he

And we were • . • I had some of the people

that had helped M:agsaysay, including his closest assistant in defense
who was over as an attache--a Philippine attache in Vietnam--and I
put him in helping Diem all the time.

The guy had tremendous ideas

and ability and energy and feeling for the people.
'Ille and who stayed on there afterwards.

And who was helping

But after I left, the Americans

and so forth. who were there were pushing them the wrong way into doing
He didn't understand a lot of things, I used to
would
+1,,t2wt
ask me "what does
beg fftm- to. We would have talks and he \:ise~
these
I had a meeting with tt:f8' bankers and they
fleoring a loan mean."?
the wrong things.

were talking about flooring a loan and everything, and I said goddam it
I'll

our AID mission people should tell you that./ Get them over. He asked
me chain of comm.and.

He said, you military talk about chain of connnand.

:;-t:t.: J_
I ~ . I'll tell you and everything.
11AA,G to tell you.

I'll get our general running

They should tell you these t hings, not just throw

these phrases around.

I told him, I said, essentially this is what it

111eans and then told him, but if we'd ever really explained ourselves as
we went along and let this guy learn to start running t hings.
sit there and he would say, "Come on out on
wi:th me," and

r

I would

trip ~around t he country

s·a id "No, you don't want to have any damn Americans 4J ; f. 4

You 1 r e a Vietnamese.

You're a Vietnamese leader.

'-/ o ~.
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C:

And yet you went on trips around the country with Ramon Magsaysay.

L:

Yeah.

That was different.

They were used to Americans in the

But not politically.

Philippines,.

Not when he was running for prese,S •

But when he was Secretary of Defense ~ But in Vietnam, the
about
independenc e and having no
~e
ive
t
sensi
highly
were
V±etnamese
ident.

foreigners.

e,re., .
It's a very anti-foreigner civilization~~ I told Diem,

you have photographers with you.

Please show me pictures of you doing

whatever you're doing there and I'll look at them, I said, with you.
And I'd look at them.
look at this guy.
down.

Re's got his hat off.

He's not looking you in the eye.

you the truth?
him.

He'd be talking to a little peasant and I said
He's h0lding it.

His head's

Row do you know he's telling

I said, That 1 s , your fault. the way you're talking to

And the way you approach him and everything.

T want to see

people with their hats on looking you in the eye and talking to you,.

A~· a friendly, leader, that they want to explain -=- what they've got
or what their problems are.

And I'd get him pictures of Sihanouk and

other leaders around Asia and show them to him.
Sihanouk out crossing a swampy ground.

I said, Now this is

The camera doesn't show all the

people lying on the ground so he doesn't get his feet wet, see, and
walk on their rumps.
C:

\.J&L-S

J).;f;:,d• he really?
I said

L:

Oh, yeah.

C:

That's funny.

I's-aid you can tell that from the fa ces of thos-e looki ng at this
the
guy,. He gradually started changing. Then I sicced Ii Filipinos on hi-m.

L:

They're. like young American college people. They taught the Vietnamese,
To (!a.rry
for example, ~ ~Diem--put him up on their shoulders--when
their feelings were up and they felt like cheering and everything.

-10-

And the last of the old Viet Minh went out of Central Vietnam by ship
when they exchanged from north to south and south to north and went
I said, you do that now.

out and Diem visited there.

And the

Filipinos taught the Vietnamese how to do it and they got Diem up
on their shoulders (and I had a picture of him and he was scared
they were going to drop him or something and he was hanging on their
hair with h±s- fists)

and all the people .cheering and you can tell
He

from their faces that it was a great moment they were sharing.

should have been yelling with them but he was looking scared, see,

b e ca. u.6e--hu:t;- I'd teas,e him about it, see, I'd say Jesus, you should have been
grinning along with. them, yelling, and it was a great moment for all of
y; e f- ,.Uet..;vi_ 0 ;, a- i,1 ,' .s 1 t'-f o _,t.{.. I
showed that picture later. I went back to ·w and they were
~

\ +-'1 0 .'e-W\
is
.
having trouble ~ they were telling me that h e ~ a Mandarin, very
remote, this that and the other thing, and

r

said, here, take a look,

-r,._Ke..
~

this :j:s the guy when I: was advising him when he was president.

a

•e-it,Lr"e..

They said, I don't believe this ' This

look at Diem and the people.
couldn't be the same man.

This couldn't ever have been taken here.

It was all different, the approach.
the feeling of the people.

And he was responding to all this,

We would find out conditions in the

countrY' and I: found out where the mosquitos were
or where simple things could be done to effec t a

particularly bad

~+-he · as

• w:~

head11')an :j:n the government could take an ac t ion that would help people
and r'd tip him off that this is so, ask them around there, so this is
what you can do.

Then have this ready to follow- up immediately.

He used to take those actions.

Mosquito ne t s and sometimes blankets

when people wer e cold, sometimes food , all d:j:fferent very simple things
that he could act as president on.
C;

Do you have, -maybe, a 25 point or 10 point or a 2 point policy - that

-11-

would have worked in Vietnam?
L:
· C:

I don't have any written out, no.
I don't mean that, I mean just in your mind.

What could we have

really done to have insured that Diem or someone like Diem was able
to
L:

Yeah

. it would have been Diem or someone like him.
Beeµ Diem maybe for a time and then someo e else.

right.

You 1 re
We could

have figured out some way for orderly change. I think that the
thrown
connnunists were/very much off their time-table and their thinking
he was president v,IAen
and
by
and everything ±:i:~e Diem was-:i::a his actions when/he refused to go
on uniting
ahead with the voting '1:ha'l:-w6t:t±a-"-ttave-tt:a:i:'l:ea-north and south afterwards.

Which was the correct thing, I think.

It was a '!:ha'!: thing

that they had rigged up under great pretensions and I think he was
~

-

much stronger than they ever thought.

He had much more of a following

than they had ever thought was possible.

He was much more a Vietnamese

nationalist than any of the ¥:i:e'l:ftamese-connnunists ever were.
-fo c.lu:t-"J e.,, .-i J dAnd people would catch on. And they had -a t.a;i.M.- tha t ~took them a
finally
out h o w
to/figure
time
long
to start bringing them down.

-----

Which they did.

I had always thought that possibly we couldn't have

won but we could have made enough political points there so that any
eventual taking over of the South would have to be far more polihcal
than the communists eyer thought.

Far more political than military.

And they would have to give up points politically to do it.

And they

would . . . there would have been a lot of compromises and it would
have wound up possibly like uh, uh, like in Europe • • . the connnunists
there.
C:

East

L:

No.

and West Germany?
Opposite Italy.

Yugoslavia.

It would have oecome much more

-12like a Yugoslavian type of solution, and uh, I thought they were
cards stacked against them.
~
there
There was . • . and what the Americans sa~a didn't omlesLctnd- was
starting entirely too late and they had

that t he French- colonial system in Indochina was that the French
e,ve.,r

i

C, ,,,J .J-,..1, ,.,_ ,te,,I, -4- 1. : 4 ~

And when they pulled out, they left behind J· ,,._,.,.
court
of people. The peP-e system that the Vietnamese

ran E-W!Urn~tLt t he ~ .
~

untrained bunch
I

+-a..

It

had wasnt a really effect:i,ve administrative arm of government.
sort of kept track of things but didn't run things and Diem had

served in that in the old imperial days and he'd been province chief
and so forth.

they'd been sort of °I,rovince

Bu't they hadn't been

\?..d--"

supervisor or advisor almost and he knew the country very well;t he
I

didn't know how to run anything; he didnt know how to administer.
He really didn't.

Nor did any of the other Vietnamese.

And, we had - -- +he1 had

a gover nment with departments in it, ministries, and Jesus,
the ministries had been run by t fe French and all of a sudden the
door man was brought in: "You are the Minister, or you are this, t hat
you
thing
and the other. ,i And all he knew was ee sit at a desk and what do you
do next?

He didnt really have a clue.

They were smart ' enough to keep

their-mouths- shut , you know, and try to get along all right and find
Some of the · ietnamese intellectuals who had college educations
or
had done it in Europe a-Ha in Hanoi (which was the only college) . .
out.

They were try-ing, themselves, to set up something .

But they 'd gone

,f!/r V

into professions, most of themAdoctors or dentists,
few lawyers-,

There were a

But there were none of them in the government , and they

needed a whole 1JliH;,s of people trained.

Well, the communists had

started in '45 with the same thing, but they didn't have the French
or anybody else there and they - - -- affairs.

started to run their own

And they killed off a lo t of their people, a lot of t heir

-13-

liquidated

officials were killed
For making mis·takes.

by tlleir own party people.

So, they gradually got people in that could run

things, administer and everything. · But they learned all the time
they were fighting the French.

Then when we took over from the French,

the Vietnamese on our side hadn't been that way, even the Army, had
been part of the French forces, had French officers running it.

And

uh, the Vietnamese units were almost untrained as a real military
force.

I held a • • • I was trying to get pacification started and

I quickly found out what it was was the Viet Minh in those days would
withdraw under the Geneva agreement ·up to the North.

Well, they

pulled out of areas in the South and what are conditions in all these
.
officials
~ or
provinces? So I called all the province/ together into Saigon a:,. a
meeting and they were practically all Frenchmen.
and district chiefs.

+-"4 +

And uh, province

And we were supposed to send vietnamese in to

I

· do tt and we didnt have any Vietnamese to do it.

We had a few

goverD11Jent people working in Saigon and Hanoi (who had come down from
Hanoi), but they had worked in offices and sat at the door when
visitors came in and so on.

Usually had them stamp things, the '.French

sy~tem of doing any, business of the government, to stamp . something
with a rubber stamp and it'd always cost you, mail a letter, they
have to stamp a piece of paper with a rubber stamp.

But they badly

needed a government service body of people, trained and everything.
So we started training on that.

But we were starting the training

6- ou Id

as· though i t ~ take ten years or twenty years.

State and AI'D working on it.

I was explaining.

We got Michigan

They had a plebiscite

f.- roM

s e t ~ Geneva to decide who runs this country and we need people
representing Saigon throughout the country and we need it tomorrow ·
~c.-and it should have been there yesterday. Where do we ge t l-t; from?

-14So I .decided our pacification would be ,

And I got to find that out.

where there wasn't anybody from Saigon out there, we can send out an
U, I\

army

C (.

: -/-

1;etffl1

Saigon.

,,_ <>11, e.,

'5 o r -,-

temporarily and let them try to run something and represent

At least they had radio communication with Saigon and they

have some discipline and some sense of order.

They ha:ve a headquarters

So, the pacification campaign was.,was, was

in Saigon and so forth.

. as soon as we'd get some people into
gett ing ;1rmy out. We had
(supply?)
pos·iti:on to :fopplant them and there werent · any roads around or anything
that civilian rule could take place and the sooner the better on it.
e leaving they

So . . . and there were several areas the Viet 11inhw/

had under -military ~tt±e control in the South, but i,t worked out at
eeneva, and we'd have to send the army in to bring la,~ and order into
But there wasnt

those areas., supplanting the Viet Minh pulling out.
-\-1,.e, r'V

a ci:vi:1 service of any sort/\that meant anything. · And T had some of the
Viet }1inh had quit in great disgust (having) discovered that the Viet
11inh were comrqunist to their great horror and they were patriotic
f '
{'f- ,· 'i
e..,
h,,._.J. C.,
VNese, and they ~ in and tried to help Diem.Se, And I started them
0

,t

""-

I.A,_

tr,li'ning people t o go out and get people to learn how· to fend for
themselves: out in the provinces and distric ts,

And I was running a big

f-- /,. ,e,:t' .

-multiple operation I.~~ his was all well on the way when I left.
know· what happened . t o all these things afterwards.
me that Di·em had stopped elections in the towns·.

I don1t

Uh , they were telling
I

Well, that wasnt so.

When I· was. there, that was the one thing we were trying

. • ·we had

teams out teaching people how to run their own affairs in each. town
and each. district and each province.

I' had veterans, a veterans.I organizat ion

started, a,nd I· was begging them to get in

and speak up to the government

off i:c ials on what was needed in place and everything to giy e the people
v o ,'c_e__.

a ch:ois~..

That apparently went by the boards.

I dotit know what happened.

I left it all on paper for people to follow through on and I left
organizations intact and had the VNese working on it.

I dodt know

whatever happened.
C:

You left in '62?

L:

No.

C:

At that Ume do you think the Viet Minh or Viet Cong by now,

I first left • • • it was in the 50s, · the end of '58.

actually,

were they communist in order to achieve nati onalist pur-,-

poses or were

/VO

L:

~.

C;

I don't know i f I

said that right.

to achieve cofflII}unist purposes . • •
L:

Were they usi.ng nationalism
"'

That is correct.

7

C:

.. +
Or were they using communism to achieve n~nalism,1

L;

They were using nationalism to achieve comll}unist pu1?pos·es. ·. And

p)o...:+,'on..._l;

p 1.A. r f'oses

many· nationalists joined in with them who were nationalists in feeling
and then Cq:Il}e • • . saw· suddenly the communist di:sc:j:plines and so
forth

get going and so a good nationalist who had done something for

the country· getting knocked out because they had done something that
6,a, IL

$ ,e. •

hurt the comjun±st• I\ And uh, didnt like it and uh, were looking for
~

And .,..; I. e-n.

something else.II Diem came along;
he got thes-e people on his side.
than Ho Chi:'Minh ever was.

~ was truly a nationalist and

And he was· a 1nuch truer nationalis·t

And that's why I was trying to tell

Washington at the time, and I told all our dumb leaders here:

I

said ,

i f you had an election today, you're telling me Ho Chi •Minh is so

well li·ked, the ·French are telling us that, and that is not true.
I · said , he heat the ·F rench but the French were hated out there fo 't'
being ·F rench.

And they're foreigners· and I said Diem would win in a

popularity contest hands down i f it could be an hones·t vote. · T don't

\
-16think anybody here believed me but I said tha

/
s true.

But I used to

wander around _in civilian clothes out there and I'd get upcountry and
kids 1 d throw rocks at me for being a dirty (illegible).
FA/

'.RU RU RU RU throwin rocks and thinking I was a lone Frenchman

out SQ1lleplace.

I'd usually dr i ve a French.

(END OF SIDE OF TAPE).

